Last week Israel's State Comptroller published a report regarding the National Security Council (NSC), established in 1999. The report criticized Prime Ministers Barak, Sharon and Olmert for not having involved the NSC in the decision-making process regarding issues of national security. The result, according to the report, was inadequate governance while challenges facing Israel mandate cross-agency cooperation in planning, decision-making, and execution.

The recommendation was to consolidate the responsibility of the NSC for providing comprehensive decision-support and staffing to the PM and to the politico-military Cabinet in matters concerning national security affairs (For the full report (in Hebrew) click here).

For this purpose, the report suggests relocation of the premises of the NSC from their present location north of Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem; solidifying the status of its head as the PM's National Security Advisor and bolstering its organizational capacities.

Between 1999 and 2001, I served as Secretary of the Negotiation Team on the Permanent Status Agreement with the Palestinians. This was before, during and following the Camp David Summit (7/00), as well as during the first months of the Second Intifada which erupted on 9/28/00; during the negotiations on the Clinton Ideas (12/00); and through the Taba Summit (1/01). I was the youngest and most junior member of the team, but nonetheless held a key position in the team.

I, too, was astonished by the lack of resources for decision-support available to the PM while designing Israel's national security. In spite of the fact that we were dealing with exceptional complexity, the delegation and the Bureau of the PM did not include more than fifteen people. In some cases, there were only three people dealing with the most sensitive issues. In many respects, our negotiation team did not have a body to turn to for support of our decisions. Often, a handful or people acted under the direct guidance of the PM.

Various governmental bodies were, of course, available to us. However, they suffered from organizational biases and incentives that made it difficult for them to understand the perspective of the PM. (more on that in the future).
It seems that the Bureau of PM Sharon functioned in a similar manner. A very small group of people designed the political process, whose climax was the Disengagement Plan, while leaving the implementation to the governmental bodies.

As a side note, these and other experiences led me to initiate the Reut Project and later to found the Reut Institute in January 2004. I will write more on that in the future, but in the meantime, click here for further information regarding the vision, mission and strategy of the Reut Institute.

Where did the Report get it right?

The recommendations in the Report can be divided into two areas. The first area includes issues that are not the subject of strong political debate and partisan controversy. For example, this area includes the operation of the secret services, exports of military technology, military build-up, research and development, and the other top-secret issues.

In this field, the Report points to flawed conduct at top levels of the GOI. For example, there is no doubt that the National Security Advisor should participate in meetings of the heads of the secret services just as there is no doubt that the NSC should be responsible for preparing Politico-Military Cabinet meetings, concluding them and following up on implementation.

The recommendations in this area are analogous to those of an organizational consultant whose goal it is to improve the management and performance of a company. Such recommendations seem reasonable and should be implemented.

Where did the report get it wrong?

The second area includes issues that are the subject of high political and partisan controversy such as the relations with the Palestinians or the decision to pull out of Lebanon. It seems that the Report fails to reflect a nuanced understanding of the degree to which strategy, diplomacy and party-politics are intertwined in the Bureau of the PM.

In other words, why should the PM trust a National Security Advisor, who is not a confidant, with decisions that may determine his political fait? Israel's chronic political instability further weakens the NSC which is prevented from dealing with partisan politics, and because it is not customary to discuss such issues in the presence of public servants. It is no coincidence that since 1999, no PM has included the National Security Advisor in such critical decisions.

The comptroller can continue to produce long reports with detailed recommendations to no avail. The ethos of the NSC does not resonate with the political realities of the Bureau of the PM. As long as the head of the NSC is not a confidant of the PM, deliberations on issues that are a hybrid of national security and partisan politics will take place in his or her absence.

What can be done?

Thus, there are two ways to upgrade the decision-making process on national security issues that are subject to deep ideological controversy. One way is to ensure that the National Security Advisor is a confidant of the PM. The implication is that the NSC would be politicized and its professional bureaucratic ethos compromised.

The other way is to bolster the Bureau of the PM with professionals who are politically loyal to the PM . This group will assist the PM in designing policy on politically sensitive issues based on the work of the NSC, which will focus on offering close decision-support. Hence, the NSC will continue to serve as a professional body subordinate to the PM.

As mentioned, recommendations regarding issues that are not subject to political controversy are very important and relevant and should be implemented.

However, when it comes to upgrading the capacity of the PM to design policy regarding issues that are subject to partisan debate and to manage their implementation, I support bolstering the Bureau of the PM into a mini-NSC with professionals who are also confidants while preserving the professional ethos of the NSC. I would not want to see the NSC turned into an expanded politicized Bureau of the PM.

The essence of the post was published on Friday 9/29/2006 in Ynet under the title: "National Security or Politics?" (in Hebrew).

Gidi Grinstein is founder and president of the Reut Institute. The views expressed in this blog are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Reut Institute.

For additional information regarding BloGidi see his original post: A Link in the Chain.