Its reform should be a top priority of the next government. The first step is simple: the head of the largest party should be the prime minister without needing to receive a vote of confidence from the Knesset.

The symptoms of Israel's crisis are evident. In the past decade, approximately ten different people served as ministers in major portfolios such as finance, infrastructure, transportation or communications. These short tenures compromised the ability to design and implement policy as politicians are weaker than the civil service, reforms are announced but not implemented, and long-term policies are often avoided. As General Giora Eiland, former National Security Advisor, frames it: "designing policy in Israel is like writing poetry while standing on a ball".

The diagnosis is also clear: Israel suffers from a harsh - potentially tragic - mismatch between the complexity of the challenges it faces, on the one hand, and the weakness of its institutions, on the other hand. The challenges are daunting and require a capacity to design policies and to implement them through sustaining cross-agency collaboration. At the same time, Israel's electoral system generates strong incentives for short-term, sectarian and populist conduct. Hence, frustrations are justified.

International organizations validate that Israelis have a good reason to be upset with their public sector. For, example, according to the 2006 Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum Israel is ranked fifteen in the world in its overall level of competitiveness. Yet, its business sector is ranked 8th in terms of its sophistication, availability of human capital or technology, while the performance of its public sector is ranked 29th. No other developed country suffers from a similar gap.

Consequently, Israel often progresses from crisis to crisis. Only standing on the edge of an abyss generates the power for needed change. A most prominent example is the successful 'Stability Package' of 1985, which came after a prolonged economic crisis, hyper-inflation, collapse of the banking system and a decade of missed opportunities for growth. Of the many other such examples one can name the education system, the development in the Arab sector, the Bedouin settlements in the Negev or the relocation of the Gaza settlers.

However, the capacity of the Government of Israel and Knesset to govern fluctuates. About a quarter of the MKs do not get reelected in every election - compared to less than five percent of American politicians. Less that than half of them can feel secure about their job. Hence, understandably, as they cling to their chairs during the first half of their tenure governments tend to be stable and strong. At the same time, as they increasingly electioneer during second half, our governments tend to spin out of order and control. Not a single Knesset has ever disbanded during its first year and only two did during the second.

This backdrop clarifies the riddle of Olmert's tenure. He was 'lucky' that the Second Lebanon War took place during his first year in office and 'unlucky' that his legal situation deteriorated during the third year. Had it been the other way around, he would have probably transcended all legal challenges but would have been ousted due to a failed War in the third year.

The opportunity before us stems from a combination of two powerful forces: the sense of urgency and the simplicity of the solution. These elections amplified the weaknesses of our electoral system against the backdrop of a confluence of economic and national security crisis. The small group of academics and insiders that has carried the message during the past years has now grown to include many politicians, the media and the public. There is ripeness for reform.

Furthermore, there is a simple way to upgrade our governance and to create the incentives that are conducive for long term, broad and substantive conduct. The head of the largest party should be directly appointed as prime minister without needing to establish a coalition of 61 MKs and passing a vote of confidence by the Knesset as is required today. This simple amendment would give a significant advantage to the large parties and therefore encourage voters to support them. At the same time, we have to preserve the principle of constructive non-confidence, which establishes that only 61 MKs can topple the government.

Hopefully, out of the constitutional ashes of our existing electoral system a new and improved Israeli system of governance will emerge. It is the most pressing Zionist challenge of our time.