Background

The pathology of the Bush Administration - and of the Olmert Government - has been setting unattainable objectives and then going for them. I have heard many people advising the new administration "not to repeat W's mistakes" citing primarily his lack of high-level American involvement and not being evenhanded. However, in my view, Bush's main mistake was repeatedly misreading what was achievable and letting wishes become objectives. His administration repeatedly set unattainable objectives and then spent enormous resources pursuing them, expectedly, to no avail. For example, as their objectives for the Annapolis Process were to achieve an agreement that would be short, quick, substantive and different than the Clinton Ideas (there is no such animal), it ended in inevitable failure. From what I am hearing, the advice that Obama has been getting suffer from the same fault.

The Two-State Solution has been the 'only game in town' for almost seventy years. The idea that the solution to the Jewish-Arab conflict in Mandatory Palestine would be two-states-for-two-peoples has dominated since 1937. It has gone through ups and downs but nonetheless remained the only possible framework for resolving the conflict. That is until recently when its relevance has been eroding to the point where now many view it as irrelevant.

Since the Israel-Egypt Camp David Accords (1979), the paradigm for realizing the two-state solution has been through 'a comprehensive Permanent Status Agreement' (PSA). This paradigm was based on the assumption that the objective of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to reach a comprehensive agreement on all of the outstanding issues e.g. Jerusalem, refugees or security. Such an agreement would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State and to 'end of conflict' and 'finality of claims' between the parties. In this context, the self-governing Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza is an essential step in this direction. Furthermore, according to this paradigm, the parties to the negotiations were Israel and the PLO in its capacity as 'the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people'.

However, this paradigm is losing ground. There are few reasons to this: First, the gaps between the parties seem unbridgeable. Second, there is a historical constitutional and political crisis on the Palestinian side where the power of Fatah party, which has dominated Palestinian politics since the early sixties, has been steadily eroding, while the power of Hamas is rising (more about that below). Third, the negotiations are premised on Gaza and the West Bank being a 'single territorial unit' while in reality, since June 2007, they are two separate and rather hostile entities.

A constitutional and political crisis on the Palestinian side. As mentioned, there is a struggle for the leadership of the Palestinian national movement between the declining Fatah party and rising Hamas. Fatah is still clinging to power in the Palestinian Authority (which governs the West Bank and Gaza) and in the PLO, which, as mentioned, holds the invaluable title of 'sole legitimate representative...' Hamas is consistently increasing its legitimacy and consolidating its power with the aim of taking over both the PA and the PLO. This crisis has become exacerbated since Hamas electoral victory (1/06) the taking over of Gaza by Hamas (6/07) that has led to the paralysis of the parliament of the PA (called the Palestinian Legislative Council) and to the formation of two governments in Gaza (led by Hamas' Haniyeh) and in the West Bank (led by Abu-Mazen and Fayyad).

Operation Cast Lead complicated the picture even further. Hamas may be strengthened politically in spite of military defeat. Israel's recent operation may end in a decisive Israeli military victory but the political outcome may be more complicated. It is likely that Hamas will emerge politically more powerful from this operation as the reality of its control over Gaza will be recognized (even if its right to govern Gaza will not) and its claim for leadership of the Palestinian national movement may be stronger while the PA, Fatah and Abu-Mazen are weakened. Furthermore, it is likely that Hamas will achieve a reopening of the border crossings with Israel or Egypt, which had been its chief stated objective since it took power.

Hamas in immature. Fatah is in crisis. Hamas remains an immature political movement that requires taming. Its decision-making processes are deliberative and cumbersome leading to positions that are ridden with internal inconsistencies. For example, Hamas declared the existing agreements with Israel null and void but demands the operation of the border crossings with Israel which are rooted in the agreement. Or, in spite of signing a ceasefire with Israel, it did not enforce it on other armed factions as it does not want to be "Israel's border guards". Fatah, the other leading political party, is in such a crisis that it can barely be viewed as a 'movement'. For example, in the recent elections in January 2006 Fatah ran multiple candidates in each district competing against each other and securing the victory of the Hamas candidate.

As Hamas grows stronger, the question of Palestinian representation is more pressing. As mentioned, since 1974 the PLO has been recognized as 'the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people'. Since 1988 it has been the interlocutor of the USA and since 1991 of Israel as well. For all these years it has been dominated by Fatah (Arafat was the chair of the PLO, PA and Fatah). In 1994, Fatah took control over the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank. For all these years, the Islamist groups such as Hamas were excluded from the PLO and PA, while the groups themselves boycotted them. Since 2006, Hamas has decided to participate in the elections to the PA (which it won) and demanded redistribution of power in the PLO. Its contest with Fatah ended in a violent coup in Gaza and its demands in the PLO have been rejected to date. Consequently, the legitimacy of the PA and the PLO as representative bodies of the Palestinians is increasingly challenged.

As Hamas grows stronger, PSA fades away. Hamas ideologically rejects the PSA paradigm, which entails 'finality of claims' or 'end of conflict'. Hence, as Hamas get stronger, this paradigm loses relevance. Therefore, the idea that one could have a Palestinian national unity government and an attempt to go for a PSA - which has been suggested to Obama by a prominent DC think tank - is likely to turn out to be an exercise in futility and a repetition of the above mentioned Bush pathology.

The dilemma of a Palestinian national unity government. On the one hand, Hamas rejects the idea of a PSA. Hence, a Palestinian national unity government with its prominent participation would not negotiate such an agreement. In other words, a PSA can only be negotiated with Abu-Mazen as the Chair of the PLO and while Hamas is excluded. On the other hand, if such a national unity government is established, it may be more open to negotiating a long-term Hudnah which does not require as difficult ideological compromises by Hamas.

Recommendations

Don't repeat the Bush pathology of setting unattainable or elusive objectives. Go for objectives that are attainable and tangible, which represent steady progress such as transfer of concrete powers and responsibilities. For example, in the absence of a broader context and framing the illegal outposts can not be stopped as the political cost for the Israeli government is too high. In a case in which such context and framing does exist, significant moves can happen easily.

Remember that an Israeli government can do almost anything in the first 1-2 years and close to nothing in year 3 and 4. No Israeli Knesset ever disbanded itself in the first year of its tenure; Very few served a full tenure. This is because in the first two years MK cling to their seats like lifelines and in latter half they electioneer.

No Israeli PM wants to control Palestinians and all want to de-occupy. There is a big and legitimate debate on the question of 'how'. Dealing with the question of security is critical particularly in the West Bank.

Reaching a PSA is unlikely in the present conditions. Such an attempt may lead to the final demise of the Two-State Solution. The paradigms of the two-state solution and of the PSA remain powerful and many are likely to call upon the USA to exercise leadership and to force the parties into a political process that will lead to a PSA. However, this is likely to be a grave mistake since one has to think about the ratification process particularly on the Palestinian side where, as mentioned, there is a historical constitutional and political crisis. My point is that putting the Two-State Solution through a moment of truth in a moment of weakness may lead to the opposite outcome and bring about its demise.

At some point, Israel and the USA will have to acknowledge the reality of Hamas control over Gaza. Some claim that Hamas can be reasonable. Israel's Cast Lead Operation represents a decision not to eradicate Hamas i.e. to 'educate' it and de-facto recognize its control over Gaza. To be clear, this does not necessarily require or mean recognizing Hamas or its legitimacy but just acknowledging the reality that exists in Gaza since June 2007. As Hamas consolidates power in Gaza, it seems inevitable that countries - including the USA and Israel - begin signaling with Hamas, indirectly negotiating with it through third parties or communicating with its representatives on issues pertaining to the shared border. Furthermore, some claim that Hamas is more likely than Fatah to agree to a long-term cease fire - Hudnah - with Israel in the form of a long-term interim agreement, which is an option that Fatah and Abu-Mazen rejected for tactical and strategic reasons (they wanted an all-or-noting comprehensive agreement).

Unilateralism and Palestinian State in Provisional Borders - The two ideas that received the most flak - remain most relevant. The two most criticized political concepts during the past eight years have been Israel's unilateralism and the idea of a Palestinian State in Provisional Borders. Few - including the undersigned - still believe the merits of these concepts relative to all other ideas out there. However, as PSA is increasingly unlikely and dangerous and in light of the Palestinian political crisis, these ideas remain the most relevant. The present negotiations represent an all-or-nothing exercise whereby in the absence of an agreement on Jerusalem (for example) there is no agreement on customs as well. However, Israel can simply hand the power of customs over to the PA on the basis of an executive decision without requiring agreement and ratification. The same can be said with regards to dozens of powers and responsibilities whose systematic transfer from Israel to the PA will lead to a de-facto emergence of a Palestinian state which can then be recognized de-jure.

In the West Bank, negotiations may not be the best idea at this time. Coordinated unilateralism may be much more effective. Israel and Abu-Mazen's PA seem to be reasonable actors. Hence, it is tempting to assume that they could negotiate their outstanding issues. However, for the reasons mentioned above, negotiations are unlikely to achieve an agreement. Furthermore, if reached, an agreement may lead to failure of the PSA in the political test. Hence, a set of orchestrated and coordinated unilateral Israeli steps to systematically hand over to the PA powers and responsibilities and even territory would build the institutions and capacity of the Palestinian entity to the point that it can be recognized as a state. We can make a lot of progress without needing agreements.

Which is first: progress in the West Bank or allowing the Palestinian political crisis to resolve itself? There are two basic scenarios for the Palestinian political system that define the political playing field. If Gaza and the West Bank remain two separate entities, any agreement with Abu-Mazen can only relate to the West Bank and will not be a PSA. If Gaza and the West Bank are allowed to explore reunification and successfully do so, then, due to Hamas participation, PSA would be vetoed. This is why the establishment of a Palestinian state in provisional borders is the most likely scenario and stated objective of the next phase of the political process.

Jordan is a critical player in the West Bank as Egypt is in Gaza. Egypt is the indispensible mediator in the negotiations concerning Gaza. Jordan is often excluded from the negotiations regarding the West Bank in spite of the fact that they have far-reaching strategic implications for Jordan through the issues of borders, Jerusalem, security, refugees, water and Palestinian statehood. Furthermore, as the PA weakens, Jordan's presence in the West Bank is essential for stability. Hence, Jordan should be involved early on in the process and take its interests into account throughout the negotiations.

Gidi Grinstein is founder and president of the Reut Institute. The views expressed in this blog are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Reut Institute.

For additional information regarding BloGidi see his original post: A Link in the Chain.